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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(j) as this matter was pouredover from the Utah Supreme Court on March 14, 1996.

(R. 1585).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Is the act or omission of Salt Lake County not to widen

the shoulder of the road along Wasatch Boulevard a discretionary
function such that immunity is retained under Utah's Governmental
Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10?
An appellate court accords the trial court's conclusions of
law no deference but instead reviews conclusions of law for
correctness.

State v. Deli. 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993) .

This issue was preserved at (R. 001325-001354).
2. Does a court have subject matter jurisdiction to hear a
claim arising out of a discretionary act or omission under Utah's
Governmental Immunity Act?
An appellate court accords the trial court's conclusions of
law no deference but instead reviews conclusions of law for
correctness.

State v. Deli. 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993).

This issue was preserved at (R.
3.

001486-001500) .

Does Keeaan v. State of Utah. 896 P.2d 618 (Utah 1995)

1

represent a change in decisional law requiring relief from
judgment under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(7)?
An appellate court accords the trial court's conclusions of
law no deference but instead reviews conclusions of law for
correctness.

State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993).

This issue was preserved for appeal at (R. 001325-001354).
4.

Did Salt Lake County waive immunity, assuming immunity

can be waived, by statements made by counsel at oral argument and
by not raising the issue again until post-judgment motions?
An appellate court accords the trial court's conclusions of
law no deference but instead reviews conclusions of law for
correctness.

State v. Deli. 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993).

This issue was preserved for appeal at (R.
5.

001406-001426).

Did the trial court err in striking the affidavit of

Tosh Kano?
The appropriate standard of review for questions of
admissibility of evidence is the abuse of discretion standard.
Salt Lake City v. Garcia, 912 P.2d 997, 999 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
This issue was preserved for appeal at (R. 001547-001451).
6.

Does Salt Lake County have a duty to widen the shoulder

of Wasatch Boulevard under the public duty doctrine?
An appellate court accords the trial court's conclusions of

2

law no deference but instead reviews conclusions of law for
correctness.

State v. Deli. 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993).

This issue was preserved for appeal at (R.

002368-002369),

in the alternative this issue should be addressed under the plain
error exception.

See State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920 (Utah Ct.

App. 1991).
7.

Did the trial court err in refusing to grant Salt Lake

County a mistrial based on the admission of evidence of the
settlement amount between Hart and Tweedy?
The appropriate standard of review for the admissibility of
evidence is the abuse of discretion standard.

Salt Lake City v.

Garcia. 912 P.2d 997, 999 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
This issue was preserved for appeal at (R.
8.

002335-002338).

Did the trial court err in failing to instruct the jury

on the apportionment of fault to the Plaintiff Richard S. Hart?
An appellate court determines the propriety of jury
instructions as a question of law, and the trial court's
instructions are reviewed as a question of law under a correction
of error standard.

Ames v. Maas. 846 P.2d 468, 471 (Utah Ct. Ap.

1993) .
This issue was preserved for appeal at (R.
9.

001277-001279) .

Did the trial court err in denying Salt Lake County's
3

motion for a new trial based on noncompliance with Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 59(c)?
An appellate court accords the trial court's conclusions of
law no deference but instead reviews conclusions of law for
correctness.

State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993).

This issue was preserved for appeal at (R. 001307-001311).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-8 (1989)
Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-10 (1989)
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-39
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60
A copy of the above-referenced rules and statutes are
attached the appendix.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This is a personal injury action arising out of a collision

between a drunk driver, Robert E. Tweedy ("Tweedy"), and the
Plaintiff Richard S. Hart ("Hart") which occurred on December 24,
1986.

Robert L. Tweedy is the father of Robert E. Tweedy and

also the owner of the car driven by Robert E. Tweedy.

Salt Lake

County was later sued under the theory that the road on which

4

Tweedy collided with Hart did not have an adequate escape lane.
(R. 00088).
B.

Course of Proceedings
On June 8, 1987 Hart filed a complaint in the Third Judicial

District Court against Robert L. Tweedy and Robert E. Tweedy as
well as John Does 1 through 10.

(R. 00002).

On January 19, 1989

Judge Sawaya allowed Hart to amend his complaint to add
additional defendants, including Salt Lake County.
78).

(R. 00076-

On January 23, 1989 Hart filed his amended complaint.

000079).

(R.

On February 13, 1989 Salt Lake County filed its answer

(R. 000102) and raised governmental immunity as a defense.

(R.

000107) .
On December 13, 1991 Salt Lake County moved for summary
judgment against Hart on the grounds of governmental immunity and
causation.

(R. 000290-000310).

On January 21, 1992 Hart filed a

memorandum opposing Salt Lake County's motion for summary
judgment.

(R. 000303).

Salt Lake County filed a reply

memorandum on February 3, 1992.

(R. 000420).

On March 9, 1992

Judge Sawaya granted Salt Lake County's motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that the accident was caused solely by
the intervening negligence of Robert L. Tweedy.
000489).

(R. 000488 -

Hart appealed Judge Sawaya's decision to the Utah
5

Supreme Court who poured the appeal over to the Utah Court of
Appeals.

(R.

004 95).

The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the

trial court and remanded for further proceedings.

(R. 000514).

Judgment was entered against Robert E. Tweedy and Robert L.
Tweedy was dismissed on March 26, 1992. (R.
conference was held on August 23, 1994.

(R.

000482) . A pretrial
00901).

On August

26, 1994 Salt Lake County submitted proposed jury instructions,
including a special verdict from which sought to apportion fault
to Hart.

(R.

000967, 001632). The case proceeded to a four day

jury trial from August 30, 1994 to September 2, 1994. (R. 001056
- 001141).

The jury found Salt Lake County was 51% negligent and

that Robert E. Tweedy was 49% negligent. (R. 001139-001140) .

The

jury awarded $1,330,000.00 in damages. (R. 001140).
On September 13, 1994 Salt Lake County filed a motion to
limit the amount of judgment in accordance with Utah Code
Annotated Section 63-30-34. (R.

001152).

Judge Medley granted

Salt Lake County's motion to limit the amount of the judgment on
December 6, 1994.

(R.

001207-001208).

On January 24, 1995

Judge Medley entered a Judgment On Verdict In Civil Action.
001263 - 001265).
After the entry of the judgment, Salt Lake County filed
several post-judgment motions and Hart submitted opposing

6

(R.

memoranda to each.

On February 1, 1994 Salt Lake County filed a

Motion For Judgment Notwithstanding The Verdict, Motion For New
Trial and Motion For Remittitur.

(R.

001267).

Hart filed a

memorandum opposing Salt Lake County's motion as well as a motion
to strike.

Thereafter, Salt Lake County filed a Motion For

Relief From Judgment Or Order/Or Addendum to J.N.O.V.
001325).
Motion.

(R.

Hart filed a memorandum opposing Salt Lake County's
(R.

memorandum.

001303).
(R.

Salt Lake County filed a reply

001406) .

On June 28, 1995 Judge Medley held a hearing on Salt Lake
County's post-judgment motions.

(R.

001433).

On September 7,

1995 Judge Medley entered an order denying all of Salt Lake
County's post-judgment motions.

(R.

001452-001458).

On

September 12, 1995 Hart filed a Motion For Reconsideration To
Limit Amount of Judgment Under § 63-30-34.

(R. 001460 -001462).

Salt Lake County filed a Motion To Dismiss For Lack Of Subject
Matter Jurisdiction on September 21, 1995.

(R.

001486 -

001487).
Salt Lake County filed a Notice of Appeal on September 21,
1995 from Judge Medley's September 7, 1995 Order. (R. 001522 001523).

On October 5, 1995 Hart filed a Notice of Appeal. (R.

001525 -001526).

Hart also moved the trial court to strike the
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affidavit of Tosh Kano. (R. 001528- 001529).

On December 4, 1995

Judge Medley in a signed Minute Entry granted Hart's Motion to
Strike the Affidavit of Tosh Kano, denied Salt Lake County's
Motion to Dismiss For Lack Of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and
denied Hart's Motion For Reconsideration.

(R.

001571- 001573).

Salt Lake County filed a second Notice of Appeal on December
8, 1995 against Judge Medley's December 4, 1995 Order as well as
Judge Medley's prior orders.

(R.

001575 - 001577).

13, 1995 Hart filed a Notice of Cross-Appeal.

(R.

On December
001578-

001579) . On March 14, 1996 this case was poured-over to the Utah
Court of Appeals.
C.

(R.

001585).

Disposition at Trial Court or Agency
Judge Medley entered a final order on December 4, 1995

denying the remaining post-judgment motions of Hart and Salt Lake
County with the exception of Hart's motion to strike which was
granted.

(R.

001572-001573).
STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

On December 24, 1986 Hart at approximately 7:00 p.m.

accompanied by his passenger Lee Cohen drove northbound on
Wasatch Boulevard at approximately 5800 South.

(R.

000003,

000081).
2.

Robert E. Tweedy, who at the time of the accident was

8

unlicensed and intoxicated, proceeded southbound on Wasatch
Boulevard on December 24, 1986 and collided with two oncoming
vehicles, a VW van and Hart's.

(R. 000006, 000035 - 000040,

000081-000082, 001808-001809).
3.

Hart sued Salt Lake County arguing that the shoulder of

the road was not wide enough and that had the shoulder been wider
Hart would have been able to escape the oncoming drunk driver.
(R. 000087 - 000088) .
4.

Hart's expert, J. Bruce Reading, testified that ASHTO

guidelines [American Association of State Highway and
Transportation Officials] are treated as the standard of care in
the design and redesign of streets and highways.
5.

001653).

Mr. Reading further testified that the usable shoulder

along the site of the accident was nine feet.
6.

(R.

(R.

001661).

Mr. Reading then testified that the usable shoulder was

in reality only seven feet because motorists tend to shy away by
about two feet from fixed objects such as mountain sides.

(R.

001662).
7.

According to Mr. Reading the proper width of the

shoulder under AASHTO guidelines was ten feet.
8.

(R. 001665).

Mr. Reading testified that the road could have been

repositioned to make a wider shoulder during a prior resurfacing

9

project and indicated that he believed the cost of moving the
road would be significant.
9.

(R. 001668, 001670).

Mr. Reading also testified that under some circumstances

the standards of the engineering industry could be relaxed,
including:
You have got an economic problem, you have
got a geological problem, there are lots of
reasons why sometimes you just can't get the
shoulder width that you need.
(R.

001694).

11.

Hart testified that he had time between the first

collision and his collision to move further to the right.

(R.

001814).
12.

Hart testified that prior to the collision between the

VW van and Hart's vehicle, he pulled to the side of the paved
road.

(R.
13.

001808, 1. 20-25).

After the first collision Hart assessed his options,

moved to the right, felt like he did not have control of his
vehicle when the tires went off of the pavement and steered his
car back onto the pavement.
14.

(R.

01809).

Hart testified that the unpaved portion felt unstable

and he was fearful that if he continued on the unpaved portion
that his vehicle would run into the mountainside.

10

(R.

001810,

1. 1-5).
15.

Hart testified he did not move to the right because

xx

[t]here was nowhere else to go."
16.

001813).

Hart testified that the total medical bills from the

accident amounted to $74,464.82.
17.

(R.

(R. 001875).

In his closing statement, counsel for Hart suggested

the dollar amount of Hart's settlement with Tweedy by suggesting
that it was inadequate to cover Hart's expenses.

(R.

002324-

002325).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Salt Lake County is immune from suit for injuries arising
out of a defect in the shoulder of Wasatch Boulevard. The act or
omission as to whether to widen the shoulder of a road which is a
discretionary function for which immunity is retained under Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1).
Because governmental immunity implicates the subject matter
jurisdiction of the courts, immunity cannot be waived or
abandoned except as set forth by the Legislature in the statutory
waivers of immunity.
Keeaan v. State of Utah, 896 P.2d 618 (Utah 1995) changed
the law of governmental immunity justifying relief from judgment
pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(7).

11

Prior to

Keegan. the application of the discretionary function exception
to claims brought under U.C.A. § 63-30-8 was conflicting and
unclear.
Even if governmental immunity does not implicate subject
matter jurisdiction, Salt Lake County did not waive immunity by
manifesting an unequivocal intent to relinquish its claim to
immunity.

Further, immunity was raised prior to entry of final

judgment due to Salt Lake County's timely filing of post-judgment
motions.
Salt Lake County did not have a duty under the public duty
doctrine to widen the shoulder of the road for Hart.

The trial

court erred in not granting Salt Lake County a new trial based on
the trial court's failure to instruct the court on the fault of
the plaintiff Hart.

The admission of the amount of settlement

between Hart and Tweedy prejudiced the rights of Salt Lake County
and warrants reversal.

The trial court's denial of Salt Lake

County's motion for new trial based on Rule 59(c) was error as no
affidavit was required.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DECISION WHETHER TO EXPAND THE SHOULDER OF WASATCH
BOULEVARD IS A DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION FOR WHICH SALT LAKE
COUNTY IS IMMUNE FROM SUIT.
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted a four-part test to

12

determine whether a particular act or omission is discretionary
under Utah's Governmental Immunity Act.

The test reads as

follows:
(1) Does the challenged act,
omission, or decision necessarily
involve a basic governmental
policy, program, or objective? (2)
Is the questioned act, omission, or
decision essential to the
realization or accomplishment of
that policy, program, or objective
as opposed to one which would not
change the course or direction of
the policy, program or objective?
(3) Does the act, omission, or
decision require the exercise of
basic policy evaluation, judgment,
and expertise on the part of the
governmental agency involved? (4)
Does the governmental agency
involved possess the requisite,
constitutional, statutory, or
lawful authority and duty to do or
make the challenged act, omission,
or decision?
Little v. Utah State Div. Of Family
Servs, 667 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 1983).

In the instant case the act or omission as to whether to
widen the shoulder of the road near the site of the accident is
at issue.

This decision is similar to the decision at issue in

Keeaan v. State of Utah, 896 P.2d 618 (Utah 1995) where the State
did not raise a median barrier along a highway to AASHTO

13

specifications.

Applying the four-part Little test, the Keegan

court concluded that the decision was discretionary. Because the
similarities between the instant case and Keegan are so striking,
Salt Lake County will employ the Little test in the context of
the Keegan decision.
First, the Court noted that "the decision involved a basic
governmental objective: to wit, public safety on the roads."
At 17.

Id.

Similarly, the decision of whether to widen the shoulder

of the road equally involves "public safety on the roads.''

Id.

Second, "the decision was essential to the realization of
that policy; it involved a determination of not only the degree
of safety that would be provided by various options considered,
but also what degree of safety would be an appropriate goal given
time and cost constraints."

Jji.

Again, the decision whether to

widen the shoulder of a road involves virtually identical
concerns.

Salt Lake County submitted in its post-judgment motion

an affidavit1 from Tosh Kano setting forth the rationale Salt
Lake County uses in making such decisions.

Although the trial

court granted Hart's motion to strike, Salt Lake County appealed

1

Pursuant to Rule 24(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Salt Lake County
notes that the affidavit of Tosh Kano was submitted on May 1, 1995 (R. 001350-001353) and
the trial court granted Hart's motion to strike on December 4,1995 (R. 001571).
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this ruling and addresses the propriety of striking the affidavit
in a later section of its brief.
Mr. Kano noted the safety determinations considered by Salt
Lake County and its decision not to widen the shoulder of the
road.

Specifically, Mr. Kano notes that a plethora of basic-

policy making factors are considered in deciding whether to widen
the road at issue. (R.

001351).

The factors included are the

volume of traffic, the number of accidents at the site and cost
priorities.

(R. 001351). Even more telling is the fact that a

major interstate highway project was in development at the time
of the accident, 1-215.

Mr. Kano testifies that because 1-215

was about to dramatically reduce traffic on Wasatch Boulevard, no
major improvements were contemplated. (R.

001351 -001352).

Even Hart's expert, Mr. Reading, put on evidence which
establishes the discretionary nature of the decision regarding
the widening of the shoulder around Wasatch Boulevard.

Mr.

Reading testified that relevant factors used in assessing whether
to deviate from AASHTO standards include

xx

an economic problem,

. . a geologic problem, there are lots of reasons why sometimes
you just can't get the shoulder width you need."

(R.

001694).

Mr. Reading further testified that he did not think "there would
be appreciable additional cost" in realigning the road in
15

comparison to the resurfacing which was done.

(R. 001670).

Mr.

Reading further conceded on cross-examination that the material
needed to build a road and the economic feasibility of building a
road were all factors which would justify narrower shoulders than
set forth by AASHTO.

(R.

001680) .

Finally, Mr. Reading

conceded that the AASHTO standards were not mandatory and that a
ten foot shoulder was not mandatory.

(R.

001679).

In addition, Mr. Kano notes that available options for
widening the shoulder at issue involves the weighing of costs and
benefits, considerations of volume of traffic and accident rates.
(R.

001352-001353).

Thus, every available option Hart may point

to involves the exercise of a discretionary function.
Third, "the decision involved the basic policy judgment and
expertise of the agency involved."

Jji.

The decision on whether

to expand the shoulder of a road is uniquely within the expertise
and province of the County, through its public works department.
Finally, the court concluded that UDOT had authority to make
the type of decision it made.

lei.

See also U.C.A. § 63-49-4(1) .

Similarly, the Salt Lake County Commission has authority pursuant
to Utah Code Ann.

§ 27-12-22 (1995)2 to make the type of

Specifically, U.C.A. § 27-12-22(3) (1995) provides that "[c]ounty roads . . . shall be constructed and
maintained by or under the authority of the county governing bodies of the respective counties from funds made
available for that purpose."
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decisions at issue.
Acts, decisions and omissions similar to the instant case
have all been characterized as discretionary by the Utah Supreme
Court.

The court has characterized as discretionary the decision

not to raise a concrete median barrier to AASHTO standards,
Keeaan v. State of Utah. 259 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 17-18 (Utah
1995), the decision to defer improvement of warnings at railroad
crossings, Duncan v. Union Pacific R. Co.. 842 P.2d 832, 835-36
(Utah 1992), and that decisions regarding the design, capacity
and construction of a drainage system to carry away flood waters,
Rocky Mountain Thrift v. Salt Lake City. 784 P.2d 459, 463 (Utah
1989).
Conversely, the governmental actions held not to be
discretionary are distinguishable.

For instance in Bigelow v.

Ingersoll. 618 P.2d 50 (Utah 1980) suspended
rule

as stated

on other

grounds

by

in Workman v. Nagle Construction. Inc.. 802 P.2d

749 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) an improperly synchronized traffic light
was found not the result of a discretionary function.

Explaining

Bigelow the Keegan court noted that, "[o]bviously, there was a
malfunction which was completely unintended and unanticipated and
did not result from the exercise of anyone's judgment."
259 Utah Adv. Rep. at 836.

Keegan.

Similarly, in Irvine v. Salt Lakg
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County. 785 P.2d 411 (Utah 1989) the court held that a County
employee's negligent operation of a backhoe was not
discretionary.
Finally, two sister state decisions have held that alleged
design defects in the shoulder of a road were discretionary
functions.

In Mayse v. Coos County. 583 P.2d 7, 8 (Or. Ct. App.

1978) the plaintiff was injured when forced onto the shoulder of
the road by an oncoming vehicle.

Plaintiff was injured when he

"struck a large boulder which projected over the shoulder and
onto the traveled portion of the road."

Id.

The court held that

the county was immune stating that "the essence of plaintiff's
claim is not a failure of maintenance, but rather that the
defendants maintained the road as designed instead of changing
it.

The decision to change a design, like the design itself, is

a discretionary act."

Id. At 9 (emphasis added).

Mayse is

particularly relevant because Wasatch Boulevard was inherited by
Salt Lake County and the essence of Hart's argument is that the
County did redesign the road to create a wider shoulder.

In

Hughes v. County of Burlington. 240 A.2d 177 (Super. Ct. N.J.
1968) cert, denied in 242 A.2d 374 (1968) the plaintiff was
injured due to an insufficiently wide shoulder.

The court held

the state immune from suit noting that "the decision to omit
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conventional shoulders in building the highway falls within the
area of nonactionable exercise of governmental discretion."

Jd.

At 179.
The act or omission whether to widen the shoulder of the
road at issue was discretionary.

The determination of whether to

widen the shoulder of a major road is not a "routine" or
"everyday" operational decision.

It involves the weighing of

such policy concerns as cost and safety and it is a discretionary
function for which Salt Lake County is immune from suit.
II.

SALT LAKE COUNTY CANNOT WAIVE OR ABANDON GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY BECAUSE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ESTABLISHES
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION.
The trial court found that Salt Lake County waived and

abandoned its claim to governmental immunity based on Salt Lake
County's:
(1) abandoning the defense in open court
during argument on Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment, (2) failing to raise the
issue of governmental immunity in any
subsequent argument, motion or pleading to
the court, and (3) failing to introduce
evidence on the issue of the discretionary
function exception during the trial of the
case.
(R.

001456).

The trial court erred in finding that Salt Lake County
waived and abandoned immunity because immunity can neither be
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waived nor abandoned because governmental immunity establishes
subject matter jurisdiction.
The application of governmental immunity determines the
Court's subject matter jurisdiction and cannot be waived by Salt
Lake County.

Although this issue is one of first impression in

Utah, that governmental immunity implicates subject matter
jurisdiction is noted by several Federal Circuits.

The Fourth

Circuit recently stated that:
[w]ith respect to the discretionary function
exception, while the FTCA [Federal Tort
Claims Act] is a grant of jurisdiction that
provides for a limited waiver of sovereign
immunity, if the discretionary function
exception applies to limit the waiver of
sovereign immunity, the jurisdictional grant
is not available, and the federal court lacks
jurisdiction to hear the case.
Williams v. United States. 50 F.3d 299, 304-305 (4th Cir.
1995). The Court further observed that u[t]he federal courts have
held consistently that they lack subject matter jurisdiction if
the discretionary function exception bars the suit."

3

Id.3

See also F.D.I.C. v. Meyer. 114 S.Ct. 996 (1994)
(1994)("Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature. Indeed,
the "terms of [the United States'] consent to be sued in any
court define the court's jurisdiction to hear the suit."); Fazi
v. United States, 935 F.2d 535, 537 (2d Cir. 1991)("If a claim
falls within this exception [discretionary function exception],
the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the claim."); Lesoeur
v. United States, 21 F.3d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1994)("federal
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Furthermore, federal courts have consistently stated that
the issue of sovereign immunity cannot be waived and may be
raised at any time during the proceedings.

See Westlands Water

Dist. v. Firebauah Canal, 10 F.3d 667, 673 (9th Cir. 1993) (wwe
have noted that sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature.
An appellate court may consider subject matter jurisdiction, on
its motion or at the behest of a party, even if it is not raised
in the district court."); Hydrogen Technology Corp. v. United
States, 831 F.2d 1155, 1162 n. 6 (1st Cir. 1987) ("It is wellestablished law that such jurisdictional defenses cannot be
waived by the parties and may be raised for the first time on
appeal or even raised by the court sua sponte.") and Leonhard v.

courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over tort actions
based on federal defendant's performance of a discrettionary
function exception."); Black Hills Aviation, Inc. v. United
States, 34 F.3d 968, 972 (10th Cir. 1994)(the application of the
discretionary function exception "is a threshold jurisdictional
issue in any case brought under the FTCA") and Attallah v. United
States, 955 F.2d 776, 783 (1st Cir. 1992)("Because § 2680(a) [the
discretionary function exception] is a limitation on the waiver
of sovereign immunity, cases which fall within the discretionary
function exception must be necessarily dismissed, as a matter of
law, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.7') . See also Truman
v. United States. 26 F.3d 592, 594 (5th Cir. 1994)(emphasis
added)(in a case not involving the discretionary function
exception the court noted that "we must first determine whether
one of the government's several waivers of sovereign immunity
applies. If not, the government is immune from suit, and there
is no subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case.").
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United States. 633 F.2d 599, n. 27 (2d Cir. 1980) ("It is
immaterial that the defense of sovereign immunity was not
expressly waived by the agencies below nor pressed by them on
this appeal.

Since sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional

defect, it can be raised at any time, and indeed by a court of
appeals on its own motion.")
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "Utah's exception to
waiver of governmental immunity closely parallel those enumerated
under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) of the Federal Tort Claims Act.

This

Court has followed the lead of cases interpreting that act."
Little v. Utah State Div. of Family Services. 667 P.2d 49, 51
(Utah 1983).

Similarly, this Court should follow the clear

weight of authority from the federal courts and dismiss Hart's
claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
In addition, a number of state courts4 have held that the
existence of sovereign or governmental immunity implicates the
subject matter jurisdiction of the court.

See Herzig v.

Horrigan. 644 A.2d 360, 362 (Conn. App. 1994)("Absent such a
clear intent, the doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates the
subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court . . . . " ) .

4

In

There is conflicting authority among state courts on this issue. See e ^ Davis v. City of
San Antonio. 752 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. 1988V
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City of Lavereane v. Southern Silver. Inc., 872 S.W.2d 687, 690
(Tenn. App. 1993) rehearing

denied

by 1994 WL 88930, the court

stated that:
the Legislature intended that the sovereign
be subject to suit only in those instances
where immunity was specifically removed. In
the absence of such a removal, the court is
without jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
Therefore, the failure to plead governmental
immunity as an affirmative defense does not
constitute a waiver of immunity.
See also Rutherford v. City of Portland. 494 A.2d 673, 675
(Me. 1985) ("sovereign immunity cannot be waived by imposition of
procedural requirements or forfeited by procedural defaults . . .
The City, therefore, did not waive its sovereign immunity
defense by failing to plead the defense in its answer or at
trial.") and Moore v. City of St. Petersburg. 281 So.2d 549, 550
(Fla. App. 1973) cert, denied

by 289 So.2d 730 (Fla.

1973)("Governmental immunity is not an affirmative defense, but
is jurisdictional and may be raised at any time.").
Language from these decisions suggests that governmental
immunity can only be waived by the legislative branch of
government.

See Shanbaum v. United States. 32 F.3d 180, 182 (5th

Cir. 1994)(emphasis added)("The United States may not be sued
except to the extent it has consented to such by statute.") and
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Jpngs v. Pitt CQunty Memprjal Hosp., 410 S.E.2d 513, 514
(N.C.App. 1991)(emphasis added)("It is for the General Assembly
to determine when and under what circumstances the State may be
sued . . . . " ) .

A deputy county attorney does not have the

authority to waive immunity beyond that which the Utah
Legislature has allowed under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
The view that Utah's Governmental Immunity Act operates as a
grant of subject matter jurisdiction is consistent with McCorvey
v. Utah State Dept. of Transp.. 868 P.2d 41, 47-48 (Utah 1993)
where the court noted that
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[u] nder our statutory scheme, the

legislature actually created, rather than abrogated, a limited
right of recovery against the state for negligent maintenance of
its roadways."

Therefore, at common law Utah courts did not have

subject matter jurisdiction to hear a claim against a
governmental entity for the negligent maintenance of a roadway.
Only the Act grants Utah courts jurisdiction to adjudicate such
claims against governmental entities.
Utah's notice of claim decisions under the Act support the
view that the Act constitutes a grant of subject matter
jurisdiction.

For example in Lamarr v. Utah State Dept. of

Transp.. 828 P.2d 535, 540 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) the Utah Court of
Appeals held that noncompliance with the notice of claim
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provisions of the Act deprived the Court of subject matter
jurisdiction.

The defendant in Lamarr did not raise the notice

of claim as an affirmative defense in its answer.

Id.

Neither

did the trial court rule on the notice of claim issue during the
summary judgment proceedings.

Instead, the trial court ruled on

the alternative theory of proximate cause.

Id.

Nevertheless,

the Utah Court of Appeals reached the immunity issue on appeal
and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Id.
The Court reached the same result in Nielson v. Gurley. 888
P.2d 130, 134 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) cert, denied

at

899 P.2d 1231

(Utah 1995) where the Court stated that u[t]he failure to comply
with the notice requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction . . .
."

The Court further observed that "because improper notice

divests the court of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to
provide proper notice of claim is a non-waivable defense that any
party, or the court can raise at any time."

Id.

Although it is

unclear, the defendant in Nielson did not appear to raise the
notice of claim issue until after the defendant lost at trial for
the first time on appeal.

Despite the apparent failure of the

defendant to raise the issue below, the court dismissed the case
25

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Icl. at 136.

Although governmental immunity has been characterized in a
different context as an affirmative defense5, whether
governmental immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction is
an issue of first impression in Utah.
None of these decisions address the issue before this Court:
whether governmental immunity is a non-waivable defense which
implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court.
Instead, these cases fashion a rule of construction for the sake
of analytical clarity.

The preference for addressing duty before

immunity was not based on an analysis of the nature of
governmental immunity.
universally followed.

Further, the rule of construction is not
See Smith v. Weber County School Dist..

877 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(1)(b) provides that: "If immunity
from suit is waived by this chapter, consent to be sued is
granted, and liability of the entity shall be determined as if

5

See Ferree v. State. 784 P.2d 149, 152-153 (Utah 1989)("[s]overeign immunity,
however, is an affirmative defense and conceptually arises subsequent to the question of whether
there is tort liability in the first instance."); CT. v. Martinez. 845 P.2d 246, 249 (Utah 1992);
Smith v. Weber County School Dist.. 877 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) and Nelson Bv
and Through Stuckman v. Salt Lake Citv. 919 P.2d 568, 574 (Utah 1996). But see Higgins v.
Salt Lake County. 855 P.2d 231, 240 (Utah 1993)(reaching a question not reached by trial court:
immunity.)
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the entity were a private person."

This language is more

consistent with establishing subject matter jurisdiction than
with language creating an waivable defense.
An analysis of governmental immunity and the decisions from
federal and state courts addressing this issue show that immunity
implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts and
cannot be waived.

If the government is immune from suit, no

court in the State of Utah has subject matter jurisdiction to
adjudicate the claim.

Therefore, governmental immunity can be

raised at any time during the proceedings as other related issues
of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time.
U

A lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any

time and when subject matter jurisdiction does not exist, neither
the parties nor the court can do anything to fill the void."
Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717, 726 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Further, "[a] lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be
stipulated around nor cured by waiver."

id. See also Lamarr v.

Utah State Dept. of Transp.. 828 P.2d 535, 540 (Utah Ct. App.
1992)("Lack of jurisdiction can be raised at any time by any
party or the court.").

See also Wright & Miller, Federal

Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 13 93 ("not only is it
impossible to waive this defense, but also a defect of subject
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matter jurisdiction never can be cured or waived by the consent
of the parties.").
There are important policy reasons why immunity in general,
and why the application of the discretionary function exception
in particular, should be treated as implicating subject matter
jurisdiction.

As noted in Keegan v. State of Utah. 896 P.2d 618,

623 (Utah 1995) the discretionary function exception embodies the
important public policy notion that ''requires . . . [the courts]
to examine whether a duty of care allegedly breached involves a
level of discretionary decision making that the legislature has
determined should not be subject to review by the court system
but instead regulated by the political process."
Thus, the recognition of immunity as implicating subject
matter jurisdiction establishes and maintains important notions
of separation of power.

The Legislature defines how and under

what circumstances it may be sued.

The courts cannot by

procedural mechanisms create liability where the Legislature has
specifically indicate there shall be no liability.
Salt Lake County requests that Hart's judgment be vacated
and the case be dismissed due to lack of subject matter
jurisdiction because the act or omission of failing to have a
wide enough shoulder is a discretionary function for which Salt
28

Lake County is immune.
III.

THE CHANGE IN THE LAW OF GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY RESULTING
FROM KEEGAN V. STATE OF UTAH IS GROUNDS FOR RELIEF FROM
JUDGMENT UNDER U.R.C.P. 60(B)(7).
Salt Lake County urged the trial court to grant it relief

from judgment pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(7)
based on an intervening change in decisional law on the
application of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 to Utah Code Ann. § 6330-8.

The trial court denied Salt Lake County's motion noting

that Keeaan v. State of Utah, 896 P.2d 618 (Utah 1995) did not
represent a change in decisional law.

(R.

001457).

The trial

court erred in reasoning that Keeaan v. State of Utah did not
represent a change in the law.
By way of brief background, the conflict in the law arose
between the interplay between two section of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act.

Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-8,

prior to its 1991 amendment read:
Immunity from suit of all governmental
entities is waived for any injury caused by a
defective, unsafe or dangerous condition of
any highway, road, street, alley, cross-walk,
sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct or
other structures located thereon.
However, Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-10(1) reads in
part that:
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Immunity from suit of all governmental
entities is waived for injury proximately
caused by the negligent act or omission of an
employee committed within the scope of
employment except if the injury:
(a) arises out of the exercise or performance
of a discretionary function exception,
whether or not the discretion is abused . . .
In Velasquez v. Union Pacific Railroad Company. 469 P.2d 5,
6-7 (Utah 1970) the Utah Supreme Court found that section -10 did
apply to an action brought under section -8.

The plaintiff in

Velasquez argued that the highway was defective because there
were no proper warning devices to warn motorists of a railroad
crossing.

Id. at 6.

The Utah Supreme Court reasoned that

because the decision of whether to put up a safety device as well
as the type of safety device to put up was discretionary, then
the government was immune under the discretionary function
exception, section -10.

Id.

Shortly after Velasquez. the Utah Supreme Court again
confronted the application of section -10 to section -8 in
Sanford v. University of Utah. 488 P.2d 741 (Utah 1971).

Sanford

arose out of construction at the University of Utah which altered
the flow of surface water which in turn caused flooding in
adjacent property,

id. at 741-42.

The property owner brought

suit against the University of Utah and a jury found the
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government liable for damages caused by the flooding.
741-42.

Id. at

The defendant raised a number of arguments on appeal,

one of which was "that the design and construction of the
drainage system were discretionary functions for which immunity
was not waived."

Id. at 743.

In response, the court held6 that

Since the waiver of immunity in Sees. 8 and 9
encompasses a much broader field of tort
liability than merely negligent conduct of
employees within the scope of their
employment, the legislature could not have
intended that Sec. 10, including its
exceptions, should modify Sees. 8 and 9, even
though it be conceded that the negligent
conduct of an employee might be involved in
an action for injuries caused by the creation
or maintenance of a dangerous or defective
condition.
The issue was not directly addressed again until Taylor v.
Qgden City School Dist.. 881 P.2d 907 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)
overruled

by Taylor v. Qgden City School Dist., 902 P.2d 1234

(Utah 1995).

In Taylor, the Utah Court of Appeals reviewed

governmental immunity decisions from Velasquez forward and
concluded that:
[w]e are unable to reconcile Velasquez.
Bigelow. and Leavitt. However, our review of

6

While Salt Lake County recognizes that Justice Russon characterized the following
language as dictum it is important to note that Justice Russon's characterization came after the
Utah Court of Appeals characterized this language as the holding of Sanford. See Smith v.
Weber County School District. 877 P.2d 1276, 1280 n. 5.
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these cases leads us to conclude that, under
the facts of this case, Sanford is the
clearest pronouncement on the interaction
between section 63-30-10 and section 63-30-9
prior to the 1991 amendments, and that
Sanford has not been definitively overruled
or limited.
Taylor. 881 P.2d at 921.
The Taylor court further noted that the Utah Court of
Appeals had previously taken the position that 63-10-10 did not
apply to 63-30-8 in Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R.. 749
P.2d 660, 667 n. 6 (Utah Ct. App.) cert, denied
(Utah 1988).

765 P.2d 1278

Shortly after Taylor, the Utah Supreme Court

decided Keegan v. State of Utah. 896 P.2d 618 (Utah 1995) which
overruled Taylor.

See Taylor v. Ogden City School Dist.. 902

P.2d 1234 (Utah 1995)(reversing Taylor v. Ogden City School
Dist.. 881 P.2d 907 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) under Keegan).
The language in Sanford which states that section 10 does
not apply to sections 8 and 9 is dictum according to the Keegan
decision.

id. at 622.

However, even if the language is dictum,

the repudiation of dictum represents a change in the law.

In

State v. Menzies. 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994)(emphasis added) the
Court stated that " [v]ertical stare decisis . . . compels a court
to follow strictly the decisions rendered by a higher court.
Under this mandate, lower courts are obliged to follow the
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holding of a higher court, as well as any "judicial dicta" that
may be announced by the higher court."
Thus, the Utah Court of Appeals and the District Courts of
the State of Utah were all obliged to follow Sanford, including
dictum contained in Sanford.

Therefore, by overruling dictum in

Sanford the Utah Supreme Court changed the law of governmental
immunity.
The holding of Keegan is directly contrary to the dictum in
Sanford and represents a change in decisional law.

The next step

in the analysis is to show whether such a change in decisional
law constitutes a sufficient basis for granting relief under Utah
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(7).
impression in Utah.

This is an issue of first

However, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals

has addressed the effect of intervening change in decisional law
on a judgment.

The last Tenth Circuit case addressing this issue

is Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce. Fenner & Smith. 39 F.3d 1482,
1491 n. 6 (10th Cir. 1994) where the Court stated that u[i]n this
circuit, a change in relevant case law by the United States
Supreme Court warrants relief under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) (6) 7 ."

7

Although there is conflicting statements within the Tenth Circuit on this issue Metz is
the last case to address this issue. Cf Colorado Interstate Gas v. Natural Gas Pipeline. 962 F.2d
1528 (10th Cir. 1992).
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Other courts require a showing of extraordinary circumstances8.
See Watson v. Symons Corp.. 121 F.R.D. 351, 357 (N.D.I11.
1988)("where substantial justice requires Rule 60(b) relief, and
unique circumstances demonstrate that the moving party has not
used the rule as a substitute for appeal, an earlier failure to
appeal does not prevent the court from reaching a just result.")
and Brown v. Clark Equipment Company, 96 F.R.D. 166, 168 (D.
Maine 1982)("These cases establish that relief from final
judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) requires a showing of

extraordinary

circumstances,7 on the basis of a judicial balancing for finality
and the need to do justice.").
Salt Lake County submits that the confused, if not
conflicting, language of Velasquez and Sanford. combined with
Taylor v. Ogden City School Dist., 881 P.2d 907 (Utah Ct. App.
1994) overruled

by Taylor v. Ogden City School Dist.. 902 P.2d

1234 (Utah 1995) resolving the application of section 10 to
section 8, followed by the Utah Supreme Court's decision in
Keegan v. State resolving the issue in an opposite manner
presents an extraordinary circumstance justifying relief from

8

There is conflicting authority on the issue of whether a change in the law constitutes a
sufficient basis to grant relief from judgment under Rule 60(b). See Wright & Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure, Civil § 2684.
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judgment under Rule 60(b)(7).

Such a confused course of

decisions does not occur often in Utah law.
In addition, comparing the policy favoring finality with the
policy favoring justice in this case, Salt Lake County should be
relieved from the judgment.

Principles of finality are minimal.

Salt Lake County moved for relief from judgment prior to entry of
final judgment, albeit after the jury verdict.

Salt Lake County

was not attempting to side-step the appeals process.

Finally,

Salt Lake County moved for relief under U.R.C.P. 60(b)(7) within
a reasonable time after the issuance of Keegan.
Case law from other jurisdictions have granted relief from
judgment under less compelling circumstances. In Koch v. Billings
School Dist. No. 2. 833 P.2d 181, 183 (Mont. 1992) a plaintiff
moved for relief from judgment over one year after entry of final
judgment in the trial court under Rule 60(b)(6) based on an
intervening change in case law.

The Montana Supreme Court

reversed the trial court's denial of the motion based on
exceptional circumstances, which included that fact that the law
was unclear and potentially misleading prior to the change in
case law.

In Overbee v. Van Waters & Rogers, 765 F.2d 578 (6th

Cir. 1985) the Court granted relief from judgment under Rule
60(b)(6) under the following extraordinary circumstances: "[t]he
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action of the Ohio Supreme Court in reversing itself within one
year is certainly an unusual occurrence."

Id. at 580.

Similarly in this case, Utah's resolution of the application
of section 10 to section 8 was confused.

In fact, the law was so

confused the Utah Court of Appeals took one position and was
within a year reversed by the Utah Supreme Court in another
decision.

This change in case law strongly compels granting

relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) either by itself or under a
compelling circumstances test.
Salt Lake County asks that the trial court's judgment
finding no change in law be reversed and that the judgment
against Salt Lake County be vacated based on the intervening
change in law.

In the alternative, Salt Lake County requests

that the case be remanded for additional hearings on the
application of the discretionary function exception.
IV.

EVEN IF GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY CAN BE WAIVED OTHER THAN BY
STATUTE, IT WAS NOT WAIVED BECAUSE NO UNEQUIVOCAL INTENTION
TO ABANDON THE CLAIM WAS EXPRESSED.
The trial court found that Salt Lake County waived or

abandoned its claim to governmental immunity in part because of
statements made by counsel for Salt Lake County.

Counsel for

Salt Lake County made the following statements at the hearing
considering Salt Lake County's motion for summary judgment:
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THE COURT: Mr. McKnight, are you abandoning
the immunity argument?
MR. MCKNIGHT: I believe so. I kind of
inherited this case. I am not sure what my
previous counsel was thinking, so I will not
pursue it now.
(R.

001400-001401).

The above statement does not meet the legal requirements for
waiver and abandonment.

Abandonment is defined as "the

intentional, unequivocal relinquishment of a benefit due from
another."

Anderson v. Brinkerhoff, 756 P.2d 95, 98 (Utah Ct.

App. 1988).

Waiver is also defined as "the intentional

relinquishment of a known right."
1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
u

Barnes v. Wood. 750 P.2d 1226,

However, the court cautioned that

[t]he party's actions or conduct must evince unequivocally an

intent to waive, or must be inconsistent with any other intent."
Id. In Bailey v. Sound Lab. Inc.. 694 P.2d 1043, 1044 (Utah 1984)
the court noted that the abandonment of a motion must be
intentional.
The language relied on by the trial court suggests no
unequivocal intent to waive governmental immunity.

Particularly

the statement, "I am not sure what my previous counsel was
thinking, so I will not pursue it now," expresses an intention
not to pursue the argument at the time of the oral argument.
37

The

statement is equivocal and tentative and cannot properly form the
basis of a finding of waiver or abandonment.

As a matter of law,

an equivocal statement cannot constitute a waiver or abandonment.
Further, the failure to raise immunity before and during
trial similarly does not constitute a waiver.

When Salt Lake

County again raised immunity in its post-judgment motion, the
judgment was not yet final.

Salt Lake County filed timely post-

judgment motions which delayed the finality of the judgment.
Therefore, the issue was properly and timely raised before the
trial court.

In addition, the failure to raise the issue at

trial should not constitute a waiver.

Although Salt Lake County

could have been more diligent in raising the issue, the state of
the law was confused and in conflict as Taylor v. Ogden City
School Dist.. 881 P.2d 907 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) overruled

by

Taylor v. Ogden City School Dist.. 902 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1995)
indicates.

When Keegan v. State, 896 P.2d 896 (Utah 1995) was

decided, the County acted promptly and submitted a motion
requesting relief from judgment under Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b)(7).
Therefore, even if this Court finds that immunity is a
waivable defense, Salt Lake County did not waive or abandon the
defense in the case at bar.

The defense was raised in Salt Lake
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County's answer and in its motion for summary judgment.

Although

counsel for Salt Lake County may have appeared to abandon the
argument, the transcript of the proceeding clearly shows
counsel's response was equivocal and did not evince an intent to
permanently relinquish Salt Lake County's right to assert
immunity.

Finally, the County expeditiously raised immunity

after the release of Keeaan v. State of Utah, 896 P.2d 618 (Utah
1995) before the judgment in the trial court was final.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE UNTIMELY MOTION TO
STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT OF TOSH KANO WHICH WAS RELEVANT TO THE
ISSUE OF GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY.
The trial court granted Hart's motion to strike the

affidavit of Tosh Kano which specified the discretionary nature
of the act or omission in widening Wasatch Boulevard,
The affidavit was submitted with Salt Lake County's Motion
For Relief From Judgment pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b)(7) on April 28, 1995.

Not until October 6, 1995 did Hart

move to strike the affidavit of Tosh Kano, nearly five and onehalf months after the affidavit was filed.
Hart waived any objection he may have had to the affidavit
by his untimely delay in objecting to the affidavit.

In light of

this extensive delay, the trial court erred in granting the
motion to strike.

See D & L Supply v. Saurini. 775 P.2d 420, 421
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(Utah 1989) (noting that party waived any objections to affidavit
submitted with Rule 56 motion by failing to object). The same
rule logically applies to an affidavit submitted in support of
Salt Lake County's Rule 60(b) motion.

By failing to object in a

timely fashion, Hart waived any objection to the affidavit's
admissibility.
Further, the substantive ground for striking the affidavit
were in error and constitute an abuse of discretion by the trial
court.

The affidavit addresses factors relevant to the issue of

governmental immunity which is relevant to the liability of Salt
Lake County as previously set forth in this brief.
VI.

SALT LAKE COUNTY OWED NO DUTY TO HART TO WIDEN THE SHOULDER
OF THE ROAD.
Salt Lake County was found liable because the shoulder at

the side of Wasatch Boulevard did not meet AASHTO specifications.
However, Salt Lake County owed no duty to Hart to widen the
shoulder of the road.

Salt Lake County objected to Jury

Instruction #23 on the grounds that there was no evidence of
negligence in failing to have an adequate escape lane.
002288) .

(R.

Further, Salt Lake County raised the specific issue of

public duty at oral argument without objection on June 28, 1995.
(R.

002368-002369).

If the Court finds this insufficient to
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preserve the issue, Salt Lake County urges consideration under
the plain error exception.

See State v. Archambeau. 820 P.2d 920

(Utah Ct. App. 1991).
"The issue of whether a duty exists is entirely a question
of law to be decided by the court."
149, 151 (Utah 1989).

Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d

Where a governmental entity is sued, the

public duty doctrine is implicated.

The doctrine has been stated

as follows:
For a governmental agency and its agents to
be liable for negligently caused injury
suffered by a member of the public, the
plaintiff must show a breach of duty owed him
as an individual, not merely the breach of an
obligation owed to the general public at
large by the government official.
Another characterization of the doctrine is that "a duty to
all is a duty to none."

Rollins v. Petersen. 813 P.2d 1156, 1165

(Utah 1991)(Durham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).

Hart has not shown, and cannot show that Salt Lake County

owed any particular duty to Hart consistent with the public duty
doctrine.
For example in Lamarr v. Utah State Dept. of Transp.. 82 8
P.2d 535 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) this Court found that Salt Lake
City owed no duty to a pedestrian traveling on an overpass to
"control" the transient population below.
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The Court reasoned

that the plaintiff "failed to establish that the City owed him
any duty of care beyond that owed to the general public.

There

is no evidence in the record that the City had any reason to
distinguish Lamarr from the general public."

Id. at 540.

Similarly in the instant case, Hart did not present evidence
that Salt Lake County was aware of Hart or was required to
undertake any special precautions to insure Hart's safety.

Hart

has not differentiated himself from the general traveling public
which utilized Wasatch Boulevard. Therefore, Hart cannot overcome
the requirements of the public duty doctrine.

See also

Brinkerhoff v. Salt Lake City, 371 P.2d 211 (Utah
1962)(governmental entity has no general duty to fence in
waterways).
Although Trapp v. Salt Lake City Corp., 835 P.2d 161 (Utah
1992) purported to limit application of the public duty doctrine
to instances where "people, not physical facilities, are the
things that must be "controlled'" Trapp can be distinguished on
the grounds that Hart's claim goes not to the failure to
Wasatch Boulevard but rather to the failure to redesign
Boulevard to provide for a wider shoulder.

maintain
Wasatch

This distinction is

important because it goes to the ability of the governmental
agency to foresee and manage its risks.
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The duty to redesign a

road to avoid the tragedy caused by a drunk driver is beyond the
scope of the public duty doctrine.

As a matter of law, Salt Lake

County owed no duty to Hart to build a shoulder to Wasatch
Boulevard that meets AASHTO specifications.
VII.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING SALT LAKE COUNTY'S MOTION
FOR MISTRIAL BASED ON THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE ON THE
AMOUNT OF SETTLEMENT.
In considering the improper admission of evidence on appeal,

an appellate court "may not interfere with a jury verdict unless
upon review of the entire record, there emerges error of
sufficient gravity to indicate that a defendant's rights were
prejudiced in a substantial manner."
366, 370 (Utah 1980) .

State v. Salmon. 612 P.2d

Further, an appellate court must find that

absent the error, u a reasonable probability there would have been
a different result."

Id.

At closing argument, Hart's counsel made the following
statement:
You have heard some instructions from the
court about settlement. Mr. Tweedy is not in
this courtroom. The court has instructed you
why. He settled his case early on with the
plaintiff. You are not permitted in the
evidence to learn the details of that
settlement, but you did hear testimony of the
amount of Mr. Tweedy's injuries, his
expenses. You heard testimony from his
father that the settlement did not even
address those. Mr. Tweedy is not here and
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you are required to determine what degree of
negligence each party should bear.
(R.

002324-002325).

Hart testified that the total medical bills from the
accident amounted to $74,464.82.

(R. 001875).

Therefore,

counsel for Hart was able to improperly inform the jury of the
amount of the settlement.

Salt Lake County moved for a mistrial

on these grounds, which was denied by the trial court.

(R.

002335-002337).
Jury Instruction #9 (R. 001087) concerns the settlement of
Robert E. Tweedy and Robert L. Tweedy and does not address the
issue of settlement amount.

The disclosure of the settlement

amount advised the jury that the settlement with Hart was not
adequate to compensate Hart for his medical expenses and invited
the jury to award an excessive amount of damages.

The disclosure

of the amount of settlement invited the jury to proportion fault
and assess damages not with respect to the evidence, but instead
to compensate for a perceived inadequate settlement.
In King v. Barron, 770 P.2d 975 (Utah 1988) the defendant in
a personal injury action brought out the fact that the plaintiff
had settled a prior personal injury case.

The plaintiff was not

allowed on re-direct to elicit evidence as to the amount of
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settlement.

The Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded on the

issue of damages noting that the plaintiff "was entitled to make
a full disclosure on that subject to rehabilitate herself and to
dispel any inference that a verdict for her would result in
double recovery."

id. at 980.

Conversely, in the instant case

Salt Lake County did not attempt to show double recovery.

Here,

Hart improperly invited the jury to compensate him for inadequate
settlement which is improper.

The admission of the settlement

amount was prejudicial and encouraged the jury to award excessive
damage.

Salt Lake County's rights were prejudiced in a

substantial manner as is evidenced by the excessive verdict in
this case.
VIII.

THE FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON
COMPARATIVE FAULT IS REVERSIBLE ERROR.
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-39(1) provides:
[t]he trial court may, and when requested by
any party shall, direct the jury, if any, to
find special verdicts determining the total
amount of damages sustained and the
percentage and proportion of fault
attributable to each person seeking recovery,
to each defendant, and to any person immune
from suit who contributed to the alleged
injury.

The trial court failed to submit Salt Lake County's special
verdict form which sought to apportion fault to Hart.
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Salt Lake

County submitted a special verdict form which called for the jury
to apportion fault to the Plaintiff Richard S. Hart.
001632).

(R.

Counsel for Salt Lake County submitted an affidavit9

which stated: "In conference in chambers with the Court defendant
Salt Lake County Commission requested that the plaintiff be
included on the final special verdict form submitted to the jury
in order to allow the jury to consider the plaintiff's negligence
in apportioning fault."

(R.

001304).

No contrary affidavit was

ever submitted10.
The trial court gave a jury instruction which did not allow
the jury to apportion fault to Hart, despite the fact that there
was abundant evidence upon which the jury could have found some
degree of comparative fault.

Furthermore, Salt Lake County

objected to Jury Instruction # 26 (R. 00002288) which contained

9

Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(e) it is noted that Hart moved to strike
the affidavit of Mr. Postma. (R. 001317). Judge Medley did not rule on Hart's motion to strike.
(R. 001452-001459). The trial court did deny Salt Lake County's motion for a new trial on
procedural grounds due to failure to file a timely affidavit pursuant Rule 59. (R. 001456).
10

The trial court stated in part: " . . . it is obvious to me that Mr. Postma has a better
recollection of discussions we had off the record than I do regarding this Special Verdict Form
issue.... I probably should not have had that discussion off the record. I am not sure Mr.
Postma's recitation is accurate at this point, but I do know for sure that I did not include the
plaintiff on the Special Verdict Form because I didn't think that there was any evidence
establishing ~ any evidence establishing that the plaintiff was negligent." (R. 002371). Mr.
Postma submitted a sworn affidavit as to his recollection which is corroborated by Salt Lake
County's special verdict form which included the plaintiff for fault apportionment purposes.
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the following: "the presence of such an emergency or sudden peril
does not constitute such an excuse or justification for
negligence if the emergency or sudden peril was caused by that
person's own fault."

(R.

001104).

This language can only be

taken to refer to Hart's potential negligence.

Having so

instructed the jury it is contradictory for the trial court not
to at least allow the jury the opportunity to apportion some
fault to Hart.
Evidence of comparative fault includes:
(1) Prior to the collision between the VW van and Hart's
vehicle, Hart pulled to the side of the paved road.

(R.

001808,

1. 20-25) ;
(2) After the collision of the VW van and prior to the
collision with Hart, Hart testified as follows:
I saw the van swerve just prior to the moment
of impact and I saw it begin to tip over, and
at that time I assessed all of my options
since I could see the mountainside and I
could see the edge of the pavement, but I
couldn't see clearly what was between the
edge of the pavement and the mountainside. I
considered the possibility of going left,
considered the possibility of going right.
Went further to the right. My tires went off
the pavement and at that point I didn't feel
like I had control of the vehicle, and I
steered back left and in a direction towards
the center line but just enough to bring my
tires back on the pavement.
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(R. 001809).
(3) Hart further testified that he did not go further or
remain on the paved portion of the road because:
[t]he unpaved portion felt very unstable. I
didn't feel like I had control over the
vehicle and I was afraid, but if I continued
traveling in that unpaved portion that the
vehicle would be pulled over and ran into
this mountainside.
(R. 001810, 1. 1 - 5 ) .
(4) Hart also testified that the shoulder "dropped off
sharply as compared with the pavement.
over the mountainside."

The vehicle began to lean

(R. 001810, 1. 9-11).

(5) Hart steered his car back onto the pavement so that all
four tires were on the pavement.

(R. 001811).

(6) Hart testified that in between the collision with the VW
van and the time the drunk driver hit him, he had time to move to
the right.

(R.

001813-001814).

Salt Lake County submits that the above testimony provides a
basis upon which a jury could infer that Mr. Hart was at least
somewhat at fault for not moving onto the shoulder of the road to
avoid the oncoming drunk driver despite

his perception that the

shoulder was not off sufficient width and grade to accommodate
his vehicle.
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-39(1) states that the trial court
"shall" direct the jury to determine the "proportion of fault
attributable to each person seeking recovery . . . ."

The

submission of a special verdict which sought to apportion fault
to Hart implicated section 78-27-39 and compelled the trial court
to give the instruction to the jury.

The failure to give such a

special verdict is reversible error.
The trial court's finding that counsel for Salt Lake County
would not seek to apportion fault to Hart is without support in
the record. (R.

001454).

The trial court, by its own admission,

stated it could not recall the events to which Mr. Postma
attested.

See note 8 infra.

Conversely, Mr. Postma submitted a

sworn affidavit which is corroborated by Salt Lake County's
special verdict form. (R.

001632).

The trial court's factual

determination was without any evidentiary support and its legal
conclusion erroneous.
IX.

THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF SALT LAKE COUNTY'S MOTION FOR
NEW TRIAL FOR FAILING TO COMPLY WITH UTAH RULE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 59(C) WAS ERROR.
The trial court denied Salt Lake County's motion for new

trial due to the alleged failure to comply with Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 59(c).

(R. 001456).

However, Salt Lake County's

motion for a new trial based on the trial court's failure to
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properly instruct on the issue of comparative fault is properly
characterized as Rule 59(7) motion and not a Rule 59(1) motion
making Rule 59(c)'s requirement of an affidavit unnecessary. Even
if Salt Lake County's motion should have been brought under Rule
59(a) (1) an affidavit was unnecessary as all the relevant facts
were contained in the record.

Further, the trial court reached

the issue of apportionment of fault (R.

001454) in its fact

determinations.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Salt Lake County asks this
Court to vacate the judgment below and dismiss Hart's claims with
prejudice or in the alternative to remand the case for an
evidentiary hearing on whether the discretionary function
exception applies to retain immunity for Salt Lake County.
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collected through attachment proceeding,
Blake v. Farrell, 31 Utah 110, 86 P. 805 (1906).
Vacation of satisfaction.
The recorded satisfaction of judgment signed
by judgment creditor cannot be vacated without action and hearing in equity, and the lien

170

of an attorney against the proceeds of the judgment does not include his personal right to execute against the judgment debtor. Utah C.V.
Fed. Credit Union v. Jenkins, 528 P.2d 1187
(Utah 1974).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments
§ 1004 et seq.
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 574 to 584.
A.L.R. — Voluntary payment into court of

judgment against one joint tort-feasor as release of others, 40 A.L.R.3d 1181.
Key Numbers. — Judgment *» 891 to 899.

Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment.
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new
judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party,
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given
under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision,
or that it is against law.
(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall
specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 69, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Harmless error not
ground for new trial, Rule 61.

Juror's competency as witness as to validity
verdict or indictment, Rules of Evidence,
Rule 606.

0f

Tab 2

Rule 60
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. JUT. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d New Trial
§§ 11 to 14, 29 et seq., 187 to 191.
C.J.S. — 66 C.J.S. New Trial §§ 13 et seq.,
115, 116, 122 to 127.
A.L.R. — Consent as ground of vacating
judgment, or granting new trial, in civil case,
after expiration of term or time prescribed by
statute or rules of court, 3 A.L.R.3d 1191.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of suggestion
or comments by judge as to compromise or settlement of civil case, 6 A.L.R.3d 1457.
Necessity and propriety of counter-affidavits
in opposition to motion for new trial in civil
case, 7 A.L.R.3d 1000.
Quotient verdicts, 8 A.LK3d 335
Propriety and prejudicial effect of instructions in civil case as affected by the manner m
which they are written, 10 A L.R3d 501.
Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view by
jury in civil case of scene of accident or premises in question, 11 A.L.R.3d 918.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of reference
by counsel in civil case to result of former trial
of same case, or amount of verdict therein, 15
A.L.R.3d 1101.
Absence ofjudge from courtroom during trial
of civil case, 25 AJL.R.3d 637.
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in
case, or with partner or associate of such attorney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64
A.LJl.3d 126.

Amendment, after expiration of time for filing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion
made in due time, 69 A.L.R3d 845.
Authority of state court to order jury trial in
civil case where jury has been waived or not
demanded by parties, 9 A.L.R.4th 1041.
Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching
verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on
ap peal, 38 A.L.R4th 1170.
j ^ y ^ ^ Q w a i V er as Lnding on later state
civij ^ ^
4 g A.L.R.4th 747.
C o u r t ^porter's death or disability prior to
trangcnbing notes as grounds for reversal or
n e w trial, 57 A.L.R.4th 1049.
Propriety of limiting to issue of damages
^ Qn
^ ^
new ^
d of
°
,
c ,
MmMt c A T o e+i,
ofdama ee
moderncafle8 6ALR5th
Jgf*
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87
*J*
,
,
r
J Excessiveness or adequacy of compensatory
d a m a e 8 for
*
P*™>™] "WW to or death of seaman in actions under Jones Act (46 USCS
Appx. § 688) or doctrine of unseaworthiness —
modern cases, 96 A.L.R. Fed. 541.
Excessiveness or adequacy of awards of damages for personal injury or death in actions under Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 USCS
§§ 51 et seq.) — modern cases, 97 A.L.R. Fed.
169.
Key Numbers. — New Trial •=» 13 et seq.,
n o , 116.

Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally
served upon the defendant as required by Hule 4(e) and the defendant has
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for
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Rule 60

obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these
rules or by an independent action.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 60, F.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
o t h e r TeaBOn

"Any
Justifying relief."
^Default judgment.
.-Impossibility of compliance with order.
—Incompetent counsel.
—Lack of due process.
—Merits of case.
—Mistake or inadvertence.
—Mutual mistake.
—Real party in interest.
—Refund of fine after dismissal.
Appeals.
Clerical mistakes.
—Computation of damages.
—Correction after appeal.
—.Date of judgment.
Void judgment.
—Estate record.
—Inherent power of courts.
—Intent of court and parties.
—Judicial error distinguished.
—Order prepared by counsel.
—Predating of new trial motion.
Court's discretion.
Default judgment.
Effect of set-aside judgment.
-Admissions.
Form of motion.
Fraud.
—Burden of proof.
—Divorce action.
Independent action.
—Constitutionality of taxes.
—Divorce decree.
—Fraud or duress.
—Motion distinguished.
Invalid summons.
—Amendment without notice.
Inequity of prospective application.
Jurisdiction.
Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable
neglect
—Default judgment.
Illness.
Inconvenience.
-—Meritorious.
Merits of claim.
Negligence of attorney.
« No claim for relief.
—Delayed motion for new trial.
—Factual error.
—Failure to file cost bill.
—Failure to file notice of appeal.
—Nonreceipt of notice and findings.
—Trial court's discretion.
"-Unemployment compensation appeal.
—Workmen's compensation appeal.
Newly discovered evidence.
—Burden of proof.
—Discretion not abused.
Procedure.
---Notice to parties.
Kes judicata.

Reversal of judgment.
—Invalidation of sale.
Satisfaction, release or discharge.
—Accord and satisfaction.
—Discharging representative of estate from
further demand.
—Erroneously included damages.
—Prospective application of judgment.
Timeliness of motion.
—Confused mental condition of party.
—Dismissal for lack of prosecution.
—Fraud.
—Invalid service.
—Judicial error.
—Jurisdiction.
—Mistake, inadvertence and neglect.
—Newly discovered evidence.
—Order entered upon erroneous assumption.
—"Reasonable time."
—Reconsideration of previously denied motion.
—Satisfaction.
Unauthorized appearance.
Void judgment.
—Basis.
—Lack of jurisdiction.
Cited.
"Any other reason justifying relief."
Subdivision (7) embodies three requirements: First, that the reason be one other than
those listed in Subdivisions (1) through (6); second, that the reason justify relief; and third,
that the motion be made within a reasonable
time. Laub v. South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n, 657
P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982); Richins v. Delbert
Chipman & Sons, 817 P.2d 382 (Utah Ct. App.
1991).
Where a defendant's motion to set aside
judgment based on Subdivisions (b)(1) and (7)
and his motion for a new trial claimed that
plaintiff violated Rule 5(a) on several occasions
by not providing defendant with a copy of
pleadings, thereby causing surprise, centering
on plaintiffs failure to provide a copy of his
motion for summary judgment to defendant,
which the latter claimed was a clear showing
offraudon plaintiffs part, the trial court could
have believed in denying defendant's motion,
that fraud was not present in what could be
considered a lapse in procedure by plaintiffs
counsel. Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d 1372
(Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Defendant's claim that he mistakenly entered into an ill-advised stipulation without
fully understanding its consequences was correctly characterized by trial court as mistake,
inadvertence, surprise or neglect under Subdivision (b)(1); because Subdivision (b)(1) applied, Subdivision (b)(7) could not apply and
could not be used to circumvent the threemonth filing period. Richins v. Delbert
Chipman & Sons, 817 P.2d 382 (Utah Ct. App.
1991).
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given by the injured person need not take a particular
f S j l and is sufficient if it indicates by any form of written
irassion t h e intention o f t n e injured person not to be bound
*^?the settlement agreement, liability release, or disavowed
dement
1}g.27-36. Right of rescission or disavowal of release,
•;"
settlement, or statement by injured person in
addition to other provisions.
The rights provided by this act are intended to be in addition
• ^ not in lieu of, any rights of rescission, rules of evidence,
'provisions otherwise existing in the law.
1973
flg-27-37. Definitions [Effective until J u l y 1,1997].
Afi u s e d ^ Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-43:
(1) "Defendant" means a person, other than a person
immune from suit as defined in Subsection (3), who is
claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking
recovery.
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty,
act, or omission proximately causing or contributing to
injury or damages sustained by a person seeking recovery,
including negligence in all its degrees, contributory negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability, breach of
express or implied warranty of a product, products liability, and misuse, modification or abuse of a product.
(3) "Person immune from suit" means:
(a) an employer immune from suit under Title 35,
Chapter 1 or 2; and
(b) a governmental entity or governmental employee immune from suit pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 30, Governmental Immunity Act.
(4) "Person seeking recovery*' means any person seeking damages or reimbursement on its own behalf, or on
behalf of another for whom it is authorized to act as legal
representative.
1994
Definitions [Effective J u l y 1,1997].
As used in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-43:
(1) "Defendant" means a person, other than a person
immune from suit as defined in Subsection (3), who is
claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking
recovery.
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty,
act, or omission proximately causing or contributing to
injury or damages sustained by a person seeking recovery,
including negligence in all its degrees, contributory negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability, breach of
express or implied warranty of a product, products liability, and misuse, modification, or abuse of a product.
(3) "Person immune from suit" means:
(a) an employer immime from suit under Title
35A, Chapter 3, Workers' Compensation Act, or Chapter 3a, Utah Occupational Disease Act; and
(b) a governmental entity or governmental employee immune from suit pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 30, Governmental Immunity Act.
(4) "Ferson seeking recovery" means any person seeking damages or reimbursement on its own behalf, or on
behalf of another for whom it is authorized to act as legal
representative.
1996

78-27-38. Comparative negligence.
(1) The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone
bar recovery by that person.
(2) A person seeking recovery may recover from any defendant or group of defendants whose fault, combined with the
fault of persons immune from suit, exceeds the fault of the
person seeking recovery prior to any reallocation of fault made
under Subsection 78-27-39(2).

78-27-41

(3) No defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for
any amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributed to
that defendant under Section 78-27-39.
(4) (a) In determining the proportionate fault attributable
to each defendant, the fact finder may, and when requested by a party shall, consider the conduct of any
person who contributed to the alleged injury regardless of
whether the person is a person immune from suit or a
defendant in the action and may allocate fault to each
person seeking recovery, to each defendant, and to any
person immune from suit who contributed to the alleged
injury.
(b) Any fault allocated to a person immune from suit is
considered only to accurately determine the fault of the
person seeking recovery and a defendant and may not
subject the person immune from suit to any liability,
based on the allocation of fault, in this or any other action.
1994

78-27-39. Separate special verdicts o n total damages
and proportion of fault.
(1) The trial court may, and when requested by any party
shall, direct the jury, if any, to find separate special verdicts
determining the total amount of damages sustained and the
percentage or proportion of fault attributable to each person
seeking recovery, to each defendant, and to any person immune from suit who contributed to the alleged injury.
(2) (a) If the combined percentage or proportion of fault
attributed to all persons immune from suit is less than
40%, the trial court shall reduce that percentage or
proportion of fault to zero and reallocate that percentage
or proportion of fault to the other parties in proportion to
the percentage or proportion of fault initially attributed to
each party by the fact finder. After this reallocation,
cumulative fault shall equal 100% with the persons immune from suit being allocated no fault.
(b) If the combined percentage or proportion of fault
attributed to all persons immune from suit is 40% or
more, that percentage or proportion of fault attributed to
persons immune from suit may not be reduced under
Subsection (2)(a).
(c) (i) The jury may not be advised of the effect of any
reallocation under Subsection (2).
(ii) The jury may be advised that fault attributed
to persons immune from suit may reduce the award of
the person seeking recovery.
(3) A person immune from suit may not be held liable,
based on the allocation of fault, in this or any other action.
1994

78-27-40. Amount of liability limited to proportion of
fault — N o contribution.
(1) Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maximum amount for
which a defendant may be liable to any person seeking
recovery is that percentage or proportion of the damages
equivalent to the percentage or proportion of fault attributed
to that defendant.
(2) A defendant is not entitled to contribution from any
other person.
(3) A defendant or person seeking recovery may not bring a
civil action against any person immune from suit to recover
damages resulting from the allocation of fault under Section
78-27-38.
1994
78-27-41. J o i n d e r of defendants.
(1) A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is a
party to the litigation, may join as a defendant, in accordance
with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, any person other than
a person immune from suit who may have caused or contributed to the injury or damage for which recovery is sought, for
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
nstruction and application.
$%he waiver of immunity from suit "for the
recovery of any property real or personal or for
Repossession thereof does not include an acSon for damages for impairment of access to
oroperty caused by construction of highway

underpass; this act should be strictly construed
to preserve sovereign immunity and to waive it
only as clearly expressed therein. Holt v. Utah
State Rd. Comm., 30 Utah 2d 4, 511 P.2d 1286
(1973).

53-30-7. Waiver of immunity for injury from negligent operation of motor vehicles — Exception.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury resultingfromthe negligent operation by any employee of a motor vehicle or other
.equipment during the performance of his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority; provided, however, that this section shall
not apply to the operation of emergency vehicles as defined by law and while
being driven in accordance with the requirements of Section 41-6-14.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 7; 1983, ch.
129, § 5.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AX.R. — Admiralty jurisdiction: maritime
nature of tort — modern cases, 80 A.L.R. Fed.
105.

63-30-8. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of highways,
bridges, or other structures.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for any injury
caused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway, road,
street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct or other
structure located thereon.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 8.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Complaint, sufficiency of allegations.
Construction.
Contributory negligence.
Dangerous objects.
Discretionary function.
Ice and snow on sidewalk.
Manholes.
Negligent construction.
New duties not created.
Nondelegable duty.
Private developments.
Traffic signs.

Complaint, sufficiency of allegations.
Claim for injuries "sustained on or about
January 15, 1902, while walking on the sidewalk along First West street between Seventh
and Eighth South, * * * through the negligence
of the city in suffering * * * a fence * * * to be
on said sidewalk/' not having misled the city,
was sufficiently definite. Connor v. Salt Lake
City, 28 Utah 248, 78 P. 479 (1904).
Where plaintiff sustained damages to his automobile on city streets, and presented a claim
for "necessary repairs to automobile $133," he
cannot claim and recover additional damages
for $1,000 for its "depreciation in value and
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pany. Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d
763 (Utah 1987).

Cited in Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d
126 (Utah 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Journal of Energy Law and Policy. —
Comment, The Only Way to Manage a Desert:
Utah's Liability Immunity for Flood Control, 8
J. Energy L. & Pol'y 95 (1987).

AJLR. — State and local government liabil
ity for injury or death of bicyclist due to defed
or obstruction m public bicycle path, 6$
A.L R.4th 204.

63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent act or omission of employee — Exceptions —
Waiver for injury caused by violation of fourth
amendment rights [Effective until July 1, 1990].
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury,
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed
within the scope of employment except if the injury:
(a) arises out of the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused;
or
(b) arises out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander,,
deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or
civil rights; or
(c) arises out of the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by
the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization; or
(d) arises out of a failure to make an inspection or by reason of making
an inadequate or negligent inspection of any property; or
(e) arises out of the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause; or
(f) arises out of a misrepresentation by the employee whether or not it
is negligent or intentional; or
(g) arises out of or results from riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, mob violence, and civil disturbances; or
(h) arises out of or in connection with the collection of and assessment
of taxes; or
(i) arises out of the activities of the Utah National Guard; or
(j) arises out of the incarceration of any person in any state prison,
county, or city jail or other place of legal confinement; or
(k) arises from any natural condition on state lands or the result of any
activity authorized by the Board of State Lands and Forestry;
(1) arises out of the activities of:
(i) providing emergency medical assistance;
(ii) fighting fire;
(iii) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or
hazardous waste; or
(iv) emergency evacuations; or
(m) arises out of research or implementation of cloud management or
seeding for the clearing of fog.
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(2) (a) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury
proximately caused or arising out of a violation of protected fourth
amendment rights as provided in Chapter 16, Title 78 which shall be the
exclusive remedy for injuries to those protected rights.
(b) If Section 78-16-5 or Subsection 77-35-12(g) or any parts thereof are
held invalid or unconstitutional, this Subsection (2) shall be void and
governmental entities shall remain immune from suit for violations of
fourth amendment rights.

Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent
act or omission of employee — Exceptions —
Waiver for injury caused by violation of fourth
amendment rights [Effective July 1, 1990].
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed
within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of:
(a) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused;
(b) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or civil rights;
(c) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or by the failure or
refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, license, certificate,
approval, order, or similar authorization;
(d) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or
negligent inspection of any property;
(e) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause;
(f) a misrepresentation by the employee whether or not it is negligent
or intentional;
(g) or results from riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations,
mob violence, and civil disturbances;
(h) or in connection with the collection of and assessment of taxes;
(i) the activities of the Utah National Guard;
(j) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or city
jail, or other place of legal confinement;
(k) any natural condition on state lands or as the result of any activity
authorized by the Board of State Lands and Forestry;
(1) the activities of:
(i) providing emergency medical assistance;
(ii) fighting fire;
(iii) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or
hazardous wastes; or
(iv) emergency evacuations; or
(m) research or implementation of cloud management or seeding for
the clearing of fog.
(2) (a) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury
proximately caused or arising out of a violation of protected fourth
amendment rights under Chapter 16, Title 78, which is the exclusive
remedy for injuries to those protected rights.
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